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Abstract 
Drawing on the wider political economy of global commodities markets, this paper analyses the dynamics of 
agrarian change related to the rise of emerging economies. Departing from an overview of China’s trade 
relations with Brazil, it discusses the consequences of these asymmetric relations for the countries’ 
international strategies and their broad impacts in developing countries. To do so, the paper is structured 
according to two objectives. The first focuses on the political economic trends of the emerging countries’ role 
in the agricultural sector, particularly through the shift in soy trade flows towards Brazil and China and their 
engagement in building a global biofuel market. The second objective connects the shifts in patterns of trade 
to an increasing wave of investments in southern Africa’s farmland and it analyses the barriers and the effects 
of this movement in Mozambique.   
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1 Introduction 
The current rise of emerging countries has produced major changes in the international economy, with 
implications for global agrarian transformations. China’s rapid growth and outward expansion of 
international trade fostered the valorisation of energy and natural resources. The country’s increasing imports 
of raw material from developing countries show a cushioning effect of the world economic crisis, 
particularly in a number of Latin American countries. Economic relations between China and Brazil have 
increased significantly in the past decade on several trade and investment agreements. However, the 
consequence of Brazil’s current tendency to specialise trade on primary goods has strengthened agribusiness’ 
already significant political influence in the country. There have been efforts to internationalise the sector 
with the growing integration of national production in the commercial and productive international circuits 
of commodities. The shift in the roles of emerging countries in agri-food trade and capital accumulation is 
giving place to new forms of contestation and international social coalitions.  
Drawing on the wider political economy of global commodities markets, this paper analyses the 
dynamics of agrarian change related to the rise of emerging economies. Departing from an overview of 
China’s trade relations with Brazil, it discusses the consequences of these asymmetric relations for the 
countries’ international strategy. Furthermore, focusing on the case of Mozambique, we analyse on-the-
ground challenges to the materialisation of Brazil’s agricultural interest and their broad consequences. To do 
so, the paper is structured according to two objectives. The first focuses on the political economic trends of 
the emerging countries’ role in the agricultural sector, particularly through the shift in soy trade flows 
towards the engagement of Brazil, China and the emerging economies in building an international biofuels 
market. The second objective looks to increasing investments in southern Africa’s farmland connected to this 
commodities shift as well as the barriers and the effects of this movement in Mozambique.    
 
2 The Making of a South-South Commodity Complex  
This section aims to discuss the shift away from the traditional production and consumption centres of 
agricultural commodities, particularly soybeans, from the US and EU complex towards new South-South 
trade flows. The emergence of the relationships between Brazil and China is examined as a lens of 
restructuring trends of the global agro-food commodities markets. It illustrates the context of new political 
economic relationships by transnational agribusiness in the context of increasing demand on the global food 
supply and increasing variability and severity of inflation in global food prices (Peine 2013; OECD & FAO 
2013). These trends have impacts on Brazil’s domestic economy, altering the country’s trade structure, and 
contributing to a more assertive international effort by the Chinese government and companies to invest in 
the global agricultural sector.  
 
2.1 China’s Agricultural Strategy in the Context of the Global Food Crisis 
The food crisis renewed the attention on global food security and the agricultural sector, reshaping the 
concept of food security to a more production-centred approach. In the current international political 
economy, China’s performance in feeding its population and its grain self-sufficiency are paramount to the 
country’s policy (Alden 2013; Zha & Zhang 2013). China GDP growth is expected to gradually slow the next 
ten years, but it remains resilient, stimulating food demand. Cereals are still at the core of the population’s 
diet, but growing incomes, urbanisation and changes in eating habits contribute to a transition toward diets 
that are higher in protein, fats and sugar. According to the OECD’s and the FAO’s projections, in the next 
decade, livestock and biofuel production are expected to grow at higher rates than crop production (OECD & 
FAO 2013). Rural development policies in China broadly aim to sustain and strengthen a very large and 
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heterogeneous agricultural sector.  
China’s national policies are fundamentally addressed to enhance food security through raising 
agricultural production and productivity (OECD & FAO 2013). These policies have partly succeeded in 
enabling high levels of self-sufficiency through government support for the domestic processing of staple 
food crops, namely corn, rice, and wheat. Such sensitivity towards grain self-sufficiency is rooted in China’s 
domestic structures: hunger and famine are deeply ingrained in its cultural mind-set and history; food self-
sufficiency matters to the political legitimacy of the Communist Party; and policies are driven by the desire 
to protect Chinese farmers, a sector that employs more than one third of the country’s labour force (Zha & 
Zhang 2013). The country is alarmed by the unreliability of the international grain market, particularly after 
the US’ economic sanctions towards China during the Cold War. 
 
Figure 1: Self-sufficiency for major crops/products in China: net exports/consumption 
 
0 indicates full self-sufficiency; -1 indicates net imports fill all domestic consumption 
Source: OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2013 
 
However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the country to maintain its high degree of self-
sufficiency in grains due to the decline in arable land and water resources as well as shrinkage in the rural 
labour force. Urbanisation has long been restricted by the use of land and household internal migration, but it 
has taken off since the 1990s, as the restrictions started to be gradually softened. This process has come a 
long way over the past two decades and over half of the Chinese population is now officially classified as 
urban. Between the 1980s and 2011, the urban population grew by a factor of four, when prior to that it was 
growing by less than 5 million people per year. By 2010, it was expanding by 20 million per year (Koen et al. 
2013). Complementarily, dietary patterns have changed, increasing the demand for meat and fish (OECD & 
FAO 2013; Zha & Zhang 2013). So constraints of land, water and farm labour appear to limit further supply 
growth. 
 
Table 1: Food consumption in China by category, rural vs. urban 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2011 
Rural (kg per year/person) 
Grains (unprocessed) 262,1 256,1 250,2 208,8 170,7 
Meat and poultry 12,6 13,1 17,2 20,8 20,9 
Dairy products 1,1 0,6 1,1 2,9 5,2 
Fish 2,1 3,4 3,9 4,9 5,4 
Vegetable oils 3,5 4,3 5,5 4,9 6,6 
Vegetables 134 104,6 106,7 102,3 89,4 
Urban 
Grains (unprocessed) 158,4 117,6 99,8 93,3 97,8 
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Meat and poultry 25,2 23,7 25,5 32,8 35,2 
Fresh milk 4,6 4,6 9,9 17,9 13,7 
Fish 7,7 9,2 11,7 12,6 14,6 
Vegetable oils 6,4 7,1 8,2 9,3 9,3 
Vegetables 138,7 116,5 114,7 118,6 114,6 
Source: OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2013 
 
In this context, the Chinese government cannot exclude a certain amount of dependence on the 
international markets to ensure agricultural supply. The openness of the Chinese agricultural sector to global 
markets has increased since 2001, when the country joined the WTO. While the country remains self-
sufficient in specific food commodities, it has exponentially increased trade of certain commodities such as 
oilseeds, dairy products, maize and sugar. From 2001 to 2012, the total value of Chinese agricultural imports 
and exports increased from USD 27.9 billion to USD 155.7 billion, with an average annual growth rate of 17% 
(OECD & FAO 2013). Other macroeconomic changes may further limit supply responses, such as the 
appreciation of the exchange rate through the reduction of the Yuan price, which makes the country less 
competitive against international markets. Furthermore, labour wage rates have inflated both in urban and 
rural contexts, creating higher costs of production (OECD & FAO 2013). Therefore, the Chinese 
macroeconomic policy of boosting exports impacts the government’s plans of increasing food security 
through national production and finishes by privileging agricultural imports.  
 
2.2 Trade Exchanges and the “China Effect” 
Emerging countries such as China and Brazil constituted a major force in the world economy over the past 
decade, underpinned by a rising middle class. The economies of these countries are being gradually 
connected to global value chains1 in terms of international trade, capital flows, and market interdependence 
(Delaney 2013; Chen & De Lombaerde 2014). There has been much controversy about the impact of China’s 
growth on the rest of the world, based for instance on concerns that imports from China have adverse effects 
on other countries’ economic growth and employment (Rangasamy & Swanepoel 2011). Indeed, the question 
of whether a country benefits from trading with China is a context-specific issue. This section focuses on the 
features and impacts of this relationship with Brazil. 
The growing trade and investment linkages between China and Brazil have assumed greater importance 
since the late-1990s (Vadell 2013). China became Brazil’s main trading partner in 2009, supplanting the US, 
and these relations have become the object of overt activism by the Chinese government. Peine has 
illustrated the integration of the Chinese pork sector and the Brazilian soy sector in a highly interdependent 
commodity complex (Peine 2013). China is currently the major world consumer of swine meat: figures are 
superior to 50 tons/year, more than twice that of the European Union (2nd major consumer) (USDA 2014). 
The country has displaced the European Union as the main destination of Brazilian soybean exports, with 
market shares rising from 15% in 2000 to 53% in 2009. For China, soybeans imported from Brazil are much 
cheaper than those grown domestically.  
However, the Chinese Government intends to encourage domestic processing and promote the importation of 
whole beans rather than processed or milled products. The soybean-crushing sector continues to expand in 
China. Despite a crush capacity of 140 million tons per year (in 2013) and plants’ low utilization rate, both 
new construction and expanded renovations raise their crush capacity to 40,000 tons per day. Besides, 78% 
of crush plants are located along the coastal region in order to facilitate the receipt of imported soy (USDA-
FAS 2014). For this reason, Brazilian soy exported to China is barely processed. The outcome of these 
                                                     
1 The global supply chain is used in this article with a focus on cross-border production linkages  
Page|4         BICAS Working Paper Series No.12 
 
BRICS Initiatives in Critical Agrarian Studies (BICAS)  
 
increasing relations has been an ongoing trade specialisation of Brazilian exports structure in natural 
resources and commodities ( 
Figure 3) (Rosales & Kuwayama 2012).  
Seeds and oleaginous fruits are the most highly valued Brazilian exports to China (37%), followed by 
iron (35%) and crude petroleum (9%), while imports include telecommunication equipment (10%), 
processing machines (8%) and several other diversified products. Such specialisation has a negative effect on 
the Brazilian manufacturing sector – already lacking in investments. This scenario of foreign competition 
favoured by overvalued exchange rates and domestic factors has imposed additional costs on the domestic 
oriented industrial sectors (Vadell 2013) and may be characterised as the “China Effect”.  
 
Figure 2: Brazil’s exports of soybeans, 2000-2013 (US$ Billion) 
 
Source: Comtrade HS 4-digit 
 
Figure 3: Brazil’s Imports and Exports to China per category, 2014 (US$ Million) 
  
Source: Comtrade BEC 
 
It would appear that China has managed to diversify its supply sources of agricultural commodities 
(mainly from Brazil, Argentina and the US), while Brazil has not succeeded in building a strong bargaining 
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position regarding these products (Rosales & Kuwayama 2012). Although China ranks amongst the top trade 
partners for a number of Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, etc.), the relationship is 
marked by an outstanding “asymmetric interdependence”. Accounting for 2.8% of total imports, Brazil ranks 
10th amongst China’s suppliers (in 2013). Therefore, both international and domestic factors have contributed 
to establish an agricultural commodity complex, which has become essential to Brazil’s trade balance and to 
China’s increasing demand for agricultural products. However, Chinese efforts to diversify its commodities 
suppliers have not been accompanied by the Brazilian capacity to increase commodities and goods exports to 
other major partners. On the contrary, the country’s macroeconomic stability has become largely dependent 
on Asian imports and it has been deepened by the low costs of Chinese industrial products – the ‘China 
Effect’ – and by the lack of adequate policies to foster domestic industry2. 
In this context, Brazil’s agribusiness sector, responsible for assuring a positive trade balance during the 
international crisis, has been promoted as a “national champion” and has strengthened its already significant 
political influence. Soy leads both the grains and the agribusiness sector’s export agenda in Brazil 
(Wilkinson et al. 2012). The Brazilian Agricultural Confederation (CNA), the main private association in the 
agribusiness sector has formed unprecedented close alliances with the Federal Government under the 
Rousseff administration, despite traditional conflictual relations between CNA and the Workers’ Party (PT). 
Many of the agribusiness claims have been answered, including an increase of public funding for production 
and commercialisation, flexibility in environmental norms, regulation of international ports, and important 
infrastructural investments. Additionally, the Senator Katia Abreu, former president of CNA, became 
Minister of Agriculture in 2015. This process has contributed to agribusiness internationalisation efforts 
beyond Latin America, as will be discussed later in this paper.  
 
3 Stepping Stones towards a New Commodity Market 
Contemporary agrarian transformations have been shaped by a dynamic mix of concerns around food 
security, energy, climate change mitigation, and rising demand for commodities (Borras et al. 2014). In 
addition to soy, the involvement of emerging countries in the shift and creation of commodities complexes 
include recent political economy around biofuels. Despite the significant slowdown of the “biofuel 
revolution”, initiatives to develop a global biofuel complex continue. The interest of Brazil’s public and 
private actors in transforming ethanol into a global commodity and promoting its commercialisation is the 
background to increasing exchanges with other emerging economies. Admitting difficulties in the ethanol 
sector domestically and in its foreign direct investments, the country is currently engaging in political 
dialogues aiming to promote international technical standards and to provide expertise in legal and 
institutional frameworks to other nations willing to develop the sector.  
 
3.1 Persistent Interests and Rising Obstacles to Ethanol Expansion 
The use of agricultural feedstock in biofuels production remains an important component of long term 
demand for agricultural products (OECD & FAO 2013). Brazil is the world’s second leading producer of 
ethanol, behind the USA. A favourable conjuncture enabled the expansion of sugarcane in Brazil, but it was 
the launch of flex-fuel cars in 2003 that stabilised the domestic market. Government strategies include 
                                                     
2 Some argue that this growing economic integration emerges as a new commercial and financial option for Brazil (and 
Latin America), in contrast to the hard constraints of the Washington Consensus. New trading opportunities, 
investments in energy and natural resources, infrastructure and financial aid and benefits to specific sectors such as 
aeronautics are important for these economies to recover from the 2008 financial crisis (Rosales  &  Kuwayama  2012; 
Vadell 2013). 
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determination of oil prices assuring feasibility of ethanol production; ethanol blending up to 27% in fuel; 
infrastructure building; and establishment of credit lines, making the sector one of the largest borrowers from 
the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). Free marketing choice between ethanol and sugar production, in 
order to better exploit price spikes or to better withstand price shocks, contribute to the sector’s current levels 
of stability, but these “flex crops” may affect price volatility in world markets (Borras et al. 2014). While 
technological research has also contributed to overcoming market fluctuations, first generation biofuels are 
still dominant. 
Brazilian ethanol companies envisage creating a global market and accessing the main markets in the 
US and Europe. A concerted effort between the Ministry of International Affairs (MRE), the Ministry of 
International Trade (MDIC), the Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) and the Brazilian Association of the 
Sugarcane Industry (UNICA)3 now has the potential to create results. The so-called “Ethanol Diplomacy” 
path driven by former President Lula has been very effective in promoting awareness on ethanol production 
internationally. Brazil has promoted the adoption of ethanol in Latin America and Africa by providing 
expertise in building legal and institutional frameworks, technology transfer and capital through the BNDES4. 
The bank has contributed to expanding biofuel production in Brazil and assuring competitiveness, by 
establishing a hub office in South Africa and has funded feasibility biofuel studies in other African countries5. 
It also signed a MoU with the African Development Bank (AfDB) and with the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) to explore collaboration in bioenergy. Senegal, Zambia and Mozambique have been 
identified as the most promising countries for developing biofuel sectors. 
In Mozambique, the feasibility study was initially conducted under the Brazil-European Union joint 
initiative in renewable energy, but was later funded by Vale S.A. (2011). The World Bank conducted a 
previous study in 2008, and in 2009 the country approved a national biofuel plan, subsequently starting 
experimental projects. The Brazil-Mozambique Action Plan (2007) created a bilateral working group for 
biofuel production and marketing. In 2012, the consulting company FGV Projetos signed an agreement with 
the investment bank BTG Pactual for the creation of a USD 1 billion fund for biofuel production. In Malawi, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, the Brazilian private sector has provided expertise for the construction of 
ethanol processing plants and the governments of these countries are keen to attract Brazilian companies. 
Furthermore, the Latin America, Caribbean & Africa Sustainable Bioenergy program (LACAf/GSB) is 
currently promoting research and technical exchange to evaluate prospects for biofuel production in 
Mozambique and in South Africa.  
However, agroecological zoning developed by the feasibility studies did not guide the projects, which 
are mainly situated around areas with existing infrastructure and services. Petromoc, the Mozambican oil 
company, signed an agreement with the Brazilian sugar company Guarani and Petrobrás Biocombustível 
with the intention of producing biofuel, but the initiative has faced major economic and institutional 
challenges. Other investors such as Sekab (Sweden), Principal Energy (United Kingdom), Aviam (Italy) 
faced similar problems. Lack of capital, policies, infrastructure, technology and skilled labour constitute 
significant barriers. Ethanol diplomacy was left in the hands of ministry-level bureaucrats during Rousseff’s 
                                                     
3 UNICA currently has permanent offices in Brussels and Washington, and intends to open an office in Asia. The 
association has been present in all the climate conferences (COP) of the UN since 2007. 
4 Brazilian companies in the private sector, and even UNICA, have been visited and consulted several times for 
expertise-sharing and information gathering. Government officials from the Ministry of Energy have also participated in 
several missions to Brazil in order to learn about the country’s experience. In addition, a newly created South African-
Brazilian joint-venture, SilvaPen, benefits from Brazil’s expertise and equipment, and has been consulted by the South 
African government during the formulation and implementation of the country’s biofuel strategy, even though the 
company depends on public funding. 
5 BNDES hired the US consulting firm Bain & Company to conduct feasibility studies in UEMOA nations (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Guinea-Bissau and Mali) using a different methodology than FGV’s 
and recommended investment in the production of sugar, followed by that of electricity and ethanol.  
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administration and perspectives for the development of an international biofuels market lost some traction as 
the EU moved toward a lower blending mandate (USDA-FAS 2013)6.  
Strong criticism from civil society organisations (CSOs) and international communities’ (particularly 
Europe) denunciation of the ethanol industry’s social, environmental and food security impacts led to the 
adoption of a series of measures to ensure the commodity’s acceptability: i) elimination of burning and 
adoption of harvest mechanisation; ii) training programmes to absorb a portion of the labour force 
unemployed by mechanisation; iii) zoning that excludes investments in the Amazon, the Pantanal and in 
areas of original forest cover; and iv) conditioning the access to credit on “good” behaviour. Yet, investments 
have not accompanied the growth in the Brazil’s domestic market, and the country has been forced to import7. 
Despite the slowdown, a set of initiatives from private and public sectors have been established, as will be 
discussed hereunder. 
 
3.2 Expertise Sharing and Political Dialogue with Emerging Economies 
Despite several arguments regarding an unlikely second edition of Brazil’s biofuel diplomacy (Wilkinson 
2014), several prospects show that the country’s ambitions are not even close to disappearing. First, China 
has shown increased interest in renewables but has yet to become a significant ethanol importer. Since 2001, 
the Chinese government has promoted E10 blending and in 2011 it established an objective of consumption 
of 5 million tons of ethanol in 5 years. It represents a major importer of Brazilian sugar and ethanol imports 
are expected to increase, particularly in a context of increasing pollution levels and the expansion of its flex 
motor vehicles fleet. The Chinese government is under pressure to reduce coal use, improving fuel quality 
and reducing industrial related pollution. In this context, the biofuel industry is advocating for the use of 
ethanol. However, ethanol production is lagging behind the government’s 12th plan due to shortages of non-
grain feedstocks and policies that tightly control the production, marketing and distribution of grain-based 
ethanol.  
Most ethanol in China is produced from grains (corn and wheat), but since 2008 government policy has 
dictated research in alternative crops, such as sweet sorghum and cassava, which can grow on marginal land. 
These crops are unable to support large-scale industrial ethanol production at this time. Furthermore, the 
country has engaged in innovative efforts in the sector and in promoting the production of advanced biofuels 
from sustainable feedstocks, announcing investments for the construction of the world’s biggest cellulosic 
ethanol plant in July 2014 (in the city of Fuyang). Of 100 projects focusing on advanced biofuels worldwide, 
18 are located in China (IRENA 2014). Some state-owned companies and coastal provinces have begun 
discussions with the central government for importing fuel ethanol as a trial to study economics and trading 
channels (UNCTAD 2014), and importation taxes have been consistently reduced (from 30% in 2009 to 5% 
in 2014). The mandatory blend rate remains unchanged at 10% in designated markets (FAS/USDA 2014).  
The Brazilian Sugarcane Industry welcomed China's initiatives in establishing a biofuels policy and 
believes that in the long run, Brazilian ethanol can meet the country's rising demand. Brazil has still the 
lower cost of large-scale ethanol production according to UNCTAD8. Therefore, while engagement with 
African countries through direct investment may not have lived up to expectations, recent years have seen 
                                                     
6 Other countries have also revised their targets as food security concerns undermine the legitimacy of first generation 
food crops as feedstock. 
7 After a disinvestment period during the 2008-09 financial crisis, with a significant number of projects being 
suspended or cancelled, a clear return was noticed in 2010. However, this time more priority has been given to 
acquisitions rather than to greenfield-type investments, given that about 70% of agricultural production is undertaken 
directly by industries (Wilkinson et al. 2012).  
8 Estimated production costs range between USD 0.20 and USD 1.38 per litre in OECD developed countries, while it is 
about USD 0.12 per litre in Brazil and between USD 0.28 and USD 0.46 per litre in China (UNCTAD 2014). 
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some renewed efforts in stimulating the promotion of a biofuels market. A second strategy includes expertise 
sharing and political coordination in international fora. The main aspects of exchange between these are: i) 
harmonisation of technical specifications and standards, considered essential to the “commoditisation” of 
biofuels (SERE/MRE, Internal Official Letter, 2011); ii) experience sharing in the policy and institutional 
framework to foster the sector’s development in third countries; iii) and the political coordination of 
emerging economies in international fora (such as the Global Bioenergy Partnership and the Biofuel 
International Forum) regarding, for instance, their vision on biofuel and international norms so that 
“consensus of these discussions incorporate the perspective of developing countries” (SERE/MRE 2013).  
In this context, subjects such as the automobile industry, bioelectricity cogeneration, integrated 
distilleries-plantation plants, and the Brazilian public bidding system for biodiesel, including the “social 
label”, have been discussed in several meetings in Brazil, India, China and South Africa (IBSA and BRICS 
technical groups). For instance, technical exchange has also been taking place at the IBSA Energy Working 
Group, in which Brazilian experts have often participated. A MoU has been signed in 2008 to establish an 
IBSA task force to encourage technology transfer, common legal frameworks, technical co-operation, trade 
and innovation in the biofuels sector. Many workshops have been organised by Brazilian counterparts on 
issues related to the sector (Brazilian Embassy in Pretoria/MRE 2010). Furthermore, Brazil is planning to 
rely on Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP) as a partner for promoting bioenergy capacity building and 
training in Latin America, Africa and Asia through short courses and meetings such as the Bioenergy Week 
(2013 in Brazil, 2014 in Mozambique and 2015 in Indonesia).  
Since 2008, a GBEP Task Force has developed a set of 24 voluntary sustainability indicators for 
bioenergy (GBEP & FAO 2011). The initiative has sought to build consensus among a broad range of 
national governments and international institutions which include elements to address the conflict “food x 
fuel”.  Finally, despite the difficulties faced by Brazilian actors to expand its biofuel industry and to carve 
out a leading role worldwide, their interests in promoting the ethanol market have not been abandoned. 
Political dialogue with China has been improved in order to increase trade relations. Meanwhile, technical 
meetings and political cooperation with other emerging countries have increased with the aim of defining 
international technical standards, sharing experiences regarding regulatory setups for biofuels (including 
blending, sustainability norms, research and deployment strategies), and coalitions with emerging countries 
in multilateral meetings, in order to overcome the debate around the food security concerns of ethanol 
production. 
 
4 Current Patterns of Agribusiness Internationalisation 
The previous sections have focused on the increasing South-South linkages through the growing flows of 
capital and goods and the displacement of the global soy complex, as well as the political dialogue to 
gradually build a biofuel complex. This section sheds light on China and Brazil’s efforts to internationalise 
their agribusiness sectors beyond their immediate regional surroundings, particularly in southern Africa. 
With a special focus on direct investments in farmland and on agricultural value chains, this section 
illustrates their strategy and intergovernmental schemes. Brazil’s interest in establishing and producing 
commodities in African countries is closely connected to the increasing Chinese demand for commodities. 
The barriers to the materialisation of these investments and the dynamics of the field will be discussed in the 
last section. 
 
4.1 Pioneer Investments in Farmland and Commodity Chains 
Sub-Saharan African and a portion of South-East Asia are the most affected zones by global land investments, 
drawing particularly on mechanisms of lease and long-term concessions allocated by governments of host 
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countries (Boche & Pouch 2014). A great diversity of actors and investment models are involved in these 
projects. National companies, sovereign funds, financial actors, multinationals and private companies not 
originally related to the farming business are finding places in different organisational forms. These farmland 
investments are often marked by strong regionalism. China’s major agricultural investments are in Asia and 
Brazil’s presence is forcibly stronger in Latin America, particularly in Bolivia (Land Matrix, 2015), but the 
increasing integration between these two countries through commodities complexes, and the outstanding 
governmental support to agribusiness, have the potential to contribute to its internationalisation towards 
other regions such as Africa. 
Regarding China, the overwhelming reliance on imports for one of the most significant food value 
chains in the country restrains political emphasis on food self-sufficiency. The Chinese National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) revised the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign 
Investment, including a special section advocating investment in the foreign soybean supply chain and 
encouraging domestic firms to “go out” and develop international resources. In this context, since 2008 the 
NDRC directives have mandated Chinese agribusiness to buy farmland and directly invest in Brazilian 
soybean production. China’s agricultural “going out” strategy is not a new phenomenon, its roots date back 
to the 1960s. However, the country’s recent presence in sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural sector has been 
surrounded by pre-conceptions: high amounts of aid, massive land grabs to feed China, an inert co-operation 
model, and centralised orchestration by the government (Gabas & Tang 2014).   
Contrary to claims in major media, evidence suggests that – as yet – there is no large-scale Chinese 
“land grabbing” in the continent (Alden 2013; Gabas & Tang 2014). According to the Land Matrix database 
(2013), which records large-scale land acquisitions, China’s public and private acquisitions represent 
290,000 ha – 15 times less than the US’ acquisition, almost 10 times less than the United Arab Emirates’ 
acquisition, and more than 6 times less than the UK’s acquisition (Gabas & Tang 2014). Such a strategy is 
apparently not only driven by the desire to produce grains for the country’s domestic consumption; rather, it 
is part of a complex process involving a wide range of players and driven by multiple objectives including 
agricultural exports, direct investment in agriculture overseas, foreign cooperation to modernise its 
agriculture and diplomatic goals of external assistance (Zha & Zhang 2013). This pattern suggests that China 
has a diversified approach, ranging from technical co-operation to commercially motivated projects and 
market-based trading arrangements.  
In Brazil, the government has prohibited foreign ownership of farmland, as it believes that this process 
may push Brazilian competitors away from business and allow territorial occupation. Even “pro-market” 
actors such as those from agribusiness sectors have voiced alarm over trends of the “foreignization” of land. 
In spite of a certain consensus on the required caution with investments, there is no agreement on concrete 
measures to be adopted (Sauer & Pereira Leite 2012). However, in Brazil, instead of direct land acquisition, 
China tends to invest in new transportation systems for Brazilian soy. This was a major point of the talks 
during the presidential visit of Xi Jinping to Brazil in July 2014. The joint-venture between China Railway 
Construction Corporation (CRCC) and Brazil’s Camargo Corrêa to build several railway lines in the Cerrado 
soy production region is an example of this objective (Aiko Otta 2014).  
Therefore, the Brazilian-Chinese commodity complex goes beyond soybean market integration, but 
includes direct investments in the supply chain in Brazil. The lack of appropriate transportation corridors 
from the production region in the Centre West region to the shipping ports is considered one of the main 
barriers to reducing exportation costs of soy. In Brazil, road transportation is responsible for 60% of all the 
country’s cargo and it is the preferred means for the transport of most produced soy to the main exporting 
ports. The transport cost of soybeans can represent up to 20% of the final cost (da Silva & de Almeida 
D’Agosto 2013). Hence, the twofold emerging strategy of increasing trade and investments on the value 
chain contributes to the integration of the commodity complex presented above.  
With respect to Brazilian investments, the country’s agribusiness internationalisation is already in full 
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swing, recognised for instance in the global consolidation of the meatpacking corporation JBS Friboi as the 
world leader in its sector. International investments by leading Brazilian corporations in other agro-industrial 
chains have normally been restricted to the industrial stage of the chains. However, more direct investments 
in farming can now be identified, including forms of contracting with the ranching and livestock sectors or 
direct investment on sugarcane/ethanol sectors (Wilkinson et al. 2012). Brazil’s direct investments in 
farmland in Africa have faced major challenges, including lack of funding and of knowledge about markets 
and institutional/legal frameworks. Only a few pioneer investors managed to settle in the continent such as 
the Pinesso Agroindustrial Company on the cotton, maize, sorghum, beans and sunflower cultures in Sudan 
and on the soy culture in Mozambique. As a consequence, emerging economies have begun deploying 
diplomacy as an additional mechanism to succeed in agro-food international investments, as will be 
discussed below.  
 
4.2 Development Co-operation as Means of Increasing Investments  
Recent research about agricultural co-operation with Africa highlights the commercial drivers of Chinese 
engagements. The Agricultural Demonstration Centres (ADC) constitute an important piece in China’s 
cooperation agenda, which puts high emphasis on financial sustainability and on the promotion of Chinese 
companies. The Wanbao Farm in Gaza Province is intended to grow rice in a region previously used by a 
former colonial authority to a large irrigation scheme (a planned farming area of 20,000 ha). The centre is 
managed almost exclusively by Chinese workers, seeds were brought from China and plantation methods 
were not adapted to Mozambican context. Language barriers also caused miscommunication with local 
farmers, but Mozambican authorities are very supportive of the project. Chinese companies are attracted by 
the potential high market margin and invest along extended value chains in the agricultural sector9 (Tang 
2014). 
Other authors highlight the increasingly “invisible nature” of land acquisitions, through the role played 
by Chinese FDI in controlling production value-chains10 or through the establishment of these ADCs, 
allowing them to control land and natural resource-related activities without owning the land. Taken as an 
example, the China-South Africa Agricultural Demonstration Centre established in the Free State11. Fraser 
and Anseeuw show how an increasing number of Chinese-backed agricultural investments in South Africa 
occur despite the country’s framework for securing land rights. The authors also suggest that land 
acquisitions are increasingly occurring toward more secure investments sites in developed and emerging 
economies, and in order to gain access to other natural resources, rather than purely the land itself (Fraser & 
Anseeuw Forthcoming).  
The Centre intends to promote both training provision and freshwater fish production, but effective 
results have been scarce to date. Prospects about production and commercial impacts remain unclear and 
socio-economic benefits have been low. The equipment was imported from China and a Chinese contractor 
was responsible for the construction of the facility and for the operational phase. Land is definitely not the 
major objective of the project – comprising only 47 hectares – but the access to freshwater appears to be key. 
Therefore, the current land acquisition trend is argued to be broader resource seeking, as opposed to sole 
                                                     
9 Wanbao aims to establish a complete machinery system, charging for the services.  
10 Control over the value-chain is orchestrated through investments in equity in production entities, as well as 
strengthened vertical integration. The integration entails control over upstream, financing; downstream, processing and 
distribution, as well as production activities (Fraser & Anseeuw Forthcoming). 
11 The China-South Africa Agricultural Demonstration Centre intended to conduct research on freshwater aquaculture 
breeding and technology and select seeds for local conditions; to demonstrate and promote freshwater aquaculture 
technology and management practice; to develop technology extension and train farmers from South Africa and 
neighbouring countries; and to promote freshwater fish consumption in South Africa. 
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market and land control. A note of caution is necessary since the centre is not fully operational yet, but it 
contributes to the argument that land deals are broadening with regard to the control over natural resources 
related to the agro-food-energy nexus (Fraser & Anseeuw Forthcoming). 
Likewise, ProSAVANA is the biggest cooperation programme in the Brazilian Cooperation Agency’s 
(ABC) entire portfolio. It is aimed at developing agricultural research capacity and the economic 
development of the northern region of Mozambique, the Nacala Corridor. It was initially inspired by 
PRODECER, a Japan-supported program of agricultural development, which was oriented towards 
commodity exports, implemented in the 1970s in the Cerrado region of Brazil (CCIJB 2011; Nishimori e o 
ProSavana 2012; Schlesinger 2013; Funada Classen 2013; Canal Terraviva entrevista Cleber Guarany 2013; 
FGV Projetos 2014). Diplomatic actions are combined with public financial support for the establishment of 
the private sector. The agribusiness internationalisation effort beyond Latin America is largely connected to 
the ProSAVANA initiative and the growing Chinese commodities market, bringing supply geographically 
closer to its demand sites. Efforts have been consolidated in order to attract Brazilian investments to the 
Nacala Corridor, including business missions, public-private seminars, technical reports and strategic 
meetings (SERE/MRE 2011b; Brazilian Embassy in Maputo 2011a; Brazilian Embassy in Maputo 2011b)12.  
The key lines considered in the ProSAVANA are the increase of productivity and the establishment of 
agricultural value chains (ProSavana 2013). It intends to include smallholder farmers in support of initiatives 
through contract farming and cluster-based agricultural growth (GRAIN & Justiça Ambiental 2013; 
ProSavana 2013). The connection between bilateral cooperation and the “potential to leverage business 
opportunities for Brazilian companies in the sector of agribusiness” has been identified as an important 
component since the programme’s early stages (Brazilian Embassy in Maputo 2003b, 1, free translation). 
Other letters showed Mozambican interest in Brazilian expertise for soy production through technology 
transfer and joint ventures, given the crop’s priority status to the African country (Brazilian Embassy in 
Maputo 2003b). Brazilian interests also include exports of agricultural machines (SERE/MRE 2012), which 
could be boosted with the More Food Programme. This provides credits to certain African countries willing 
to buy Brazilian agricultural machines adapted to family farming. 
ProSAVANA is coupled with an entire scheme to attract investments to Mozambique: infrastructure 
development, research for adaptation of agricultural varieties, and legal and institutional security. Together, 
these incentives were expected to overcome unfamiliarity and high costs handled by Brazilian investors on 
the African continent. In addition, Mozambique’s proximity to the Asian markets represents major 
encouragement for the internationalisation of Brazil’s productive component to southern Africa, as 
previously stated (Interview, 04/07/2013). So far, these investments have faced challenges in materialising 
despite Mozambican high-level support to the initiative 13 . Brazil’s institutional environment is still 
considered favourable for agricultural investments and land prices remain competitive. Moreover, in the past 
two years, ProSAVANA has been subject to strong criticism by local and international CSOs, as will be 
discussed in the last section.  
Emerging and middle-income countries are the main players of foreign investments in farmland. 
                                                     
12 In November 2010 a business mission organized by CNA with ABC’s support brought Brazilian agribusiness 
investors to Mozambique in coordination with the ProSavana team. Leading the mission Senator Katia Abreu, president 
of CNA, invited the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture to visit Brazil and proposed that the CNA’s technical branch, 
SENAR, be directly involved in ProSavana (SERE/MRE 2011b). As a result of this visit, the Seminar “Agribusiness in 
Mozambique: Brazil-Japan International Cooperation and Investments Opportunities” was held in São Paulo in April 
2011 with the aim of publicising potential for investments in Nacala Corridor for Brazil’s private sector (SERE/MRE 
2011b). 
13 Discussions pointing to this integrated perspective have been identified since the Programme’s formulation in 2003 
when Mozambican Government officials expressed to the Brazilian Ambassador their country’s interest in benefiting 
from Vale’s investments in transport infrastructure for other sectors, particularly agribusiness (Brazilian Embassy in 
Maputo 2003c). 
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However, this trend is marked by a strong regionalism, hence South Africans tend to play a more significant 
role in Southern Africa (Hall 2011) than Chinese or Brazilian investors, despite overall concerns. The recent 
movement of investments in farmland and in value chains in southern Africa illustrates the South-South 
character of the current phenomenon and is closely connected to the commodities complex integrating China 
and Brazil. This is also based on emerging countries’ ambitions of playing a stronger political role in the 
international system through development cooperation initiatives. This movement has face significant 
constraints, however it did not prevent the production of local and national effects, as will be discussed in the 
section below. 
 
5 Challenging Dynamics from the Field 
The emerging countries’ efforts in internationalising their agribusiness sector beyond their immediate zones 
of influence face several challenges. This section discusses some of the results of these projects when they 
reach the field. According to Borras and Franco, many of the reported land transactions are real and 
successfully being implemented; others remain only on paper, while still others are more speculative in 
nature (S.J. Borras & Franco 2010). Brazil and China’s projects have followed the same trend and faced 
increasing tests regarding local politics and civil society struggles. This section evaluates the potential of 
materialisation of these two countries’ agricultural projects in Mozambique and discusses some of the broad 
consequences of such recent strategy.  
 
5.1 Potential of Projects’ Materialisation 
A great deal of agricultural foreign investments approved worldwide fail to be implemented (Deininger & 
Byerlee 2011; Anseeuw et al. 2012). This is due to factors such as: i) the underestimation of the technical 
difficulties and management; ii) the lack of the necessary attributes and high transaction costs; and iii) the 
speculative position of some investors to ensure the property (Anseeuw et al. 2012). In addition, biofuel 
international promotion lost some of the track when faced with declining oil prices, reduction of the 
objectives of European policy, and the failure of a number of projects. Besides, high institutional risks and 
contestation movements contribute to delay projects such as ProSAVANA. This may constitute a particular 
challenge to projects led by emerging countries due to their weak policy concerning civil society 
participation.  
In Mozambique, failure rates are very high both in negotiation and implementation processes. Land 
surface actually occupied in the country represents only 8% of the total announced. Many projects are not 
economically viable considering prices system, cost of capital, settlement and transaction costs, and technical 
and managerial difficulties14 (Boche 2015). This is especially true for the biofuel projects, which require 
high technical management and a strong institutional framework including organized industry and a policy of 
prices. In this context, many South African commercial farmers became service providers for other foreign 
investors willing to settle in Mozambique15 . Brazilian investors have also reported their interest in 
establishing joint ventures with South African companies to benefit from their expertise in Mozambique and 
other countries in the region.  
                                                     
14 Transaction costs include diverse analysis regarding agricultural conditions (soil, climate and land use) and national 
institutional frameworks.  
15 Anseeuw et al. (Forthcoming) illustrate the example of the company Agri-SA, which has been invited, either as 
farmers or as managers, to more than 42 countries in Africa. South African agribusiness companies specialised in farm 
inputs (Pannar, Omnia), processing (Illovo and Tongaat-Hulet), packaging (Westfalia) and integrated service providers 
(Unitrans), as well as some of the recently privatised cooperatives, in particular AFGRI, have developed activities 
throughout southern Africa and beyond, proposing financial and technical services. 
The Role of Brazil and China in Contemporary Agrarian Transformations  Page|13 
 
 BRICS Initiatives in Critical Agrarian Studies (BICAS) 
 
Furthermore, both Brazilian and Chinese projects have faced severe criticism from CSO. A national 
campaign has emerged against ProSAVANA, supported by international and Brazilian NGOs. This 
transnational coalition stems from political statements presenting the triangular initiative as inspired by the 
Cerrado development model. Alarmist articles produced by national and international media intended to 
draw the public’s attention to the risk of “land grabbing” (GRAIN et al. 2012). For instance, representatives 
of the Mozambican Peasant’s Union (UNAC) and other local Mozambican organisations of the Nampula 
Province Civil Society Platform (PPOSC-N) have participated in technical visits to Brazil in 2012, with the 
technical support of organisations historically engaged in activism against the “Cerrado model”, such as 
FASE.  
The Brazilian Peasants’ Movement (MPA), the National Confederation of Rural Workers (CONTAG), 
the Movement of Peasant Women (MMC), and other CSOs have strongly adhered to the campaign and 
claimed the creation of a space of dialogue with the Brazilian government about the modalities of its 
Development Co-operation. Japanese civil society has also been called upon to mobilise and integrate into 
the contentious network under the frameworks of Via Campesina, the international alter-globalisation 
movement ATTAC, Africa Japan Forum (AJF)16. Shared values and a common discourse towards agriculture 
modernisation and large-scale investments bound them together and continued financial support from NGOs, 
such as Oxfam and ActionAid, ensured the increasing exchange of information, international meetings17 and 
open letters to national leaders18.  
This joint effort opposing the project has contributed to a prolonged debate on its vision and activities. 
The impact of international criticism has also alarmed potential investors that recognised costs related to the 
increased opposition. Integrated strategies combining infrastructure development, agricultural research and 
funding may not be sufficient for attracting significant amounts of investments with no “social licence to 
operate”. The Nacala Fund, originally conceptualized as a private equity fund based in Luxembourg has been 
reformulated due to fundraising failure, lack of strategic alignment among partner countries, inefficient 
institutional communication and civil society pressure (FASE 2014). The current plan proposes a private 
company based in Mozambique with no participation of Brazilian or Japanese governments and no mandate 
to support social initiatives.  
On-the-ground surveys showed that for the moment there are no land grabbing initiatives related to 
ProSAVANA19. This does not mean that ProSAVANA is paralysed or that private investors abandoned the 
idea of settling in Mozambique. Larger-scale investments have recently been directed to Niassa province, 
which is less populated. Only a few Brazilian investors have been identified in Niassa and Zambezia, but 
private interests seem now to increasingly focus on the Pemba-Lichinga Corridor (north of Nacala Corridor) 
where agricultural conditions, weaker civil society articulation and prospects for investments in 
infrastructure20 are positive. Furthermore, the Quick Impact Projects are ongoing and aiming to establish 
preparatory activities for the agribusiness clusters. The ProSAVANA Development Initiative Fund (PDIF)21 
selected five companies to receive loans for the establishment of contract farming, marketing and equipment 
acquisition (interest 5-10%). Operational difficulties have been reported in 2014 regarding some of the 
projects (Oruwera, Ikuru and Matharia), as well as farmers’ complaints about the establishment of individual 
                                                     
16Japanese civil society statement on ProSAVANA: Call for an Immediate Suspension and Fundamental Review, 
September 30, 2013. 
17 Triangular Conference of the Peoples Against the ProSavana, Maputo, August 7-8 2013 
18 “Open Letter from Mozambican civil society organisations and movements to the presidents of Mozambique and 
Brazil and the Prime Minister of Japan”, Maputo, May 28, 2013. 
19 Other authors and stakeholders have come to the same conclusion (Ekman & Macamo 2014). 
20 The Project for the Nacala Corridor Economic Development Strategies (PEDEC) funded by JICA is promoting 
private investments in agricultural, infrastructure and the energy sector in Nampula, Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Tete and 
Zambézia.  
21 With an initial investment of USD 750,000 and support by the investment company GAPI. 
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contracts with larger farmers (and not by means of producer organisations).  
Chinese projects have faced similar challenges. The Wanbao project in Xai-Xai suffered from extreme 
flooding events and other initiatives such as cotton development projects were affected by the civil armed 
conflict in Sofala in 2014. Chinese investors in Mozambique’s agricultural sector have not yet recovered 
initial investments. This did not prevent companies from investing in the country, which are increasingly 
focusing on extended value chains (Tang 2014). The Chinese ADC has also served as a base for Chinese 
investors to better understand Mozambique’s market context. Land concession in the Gaza province also 
received criticism from CSOs, particularly FONGA.  
The project has been accused of contributing to neo-patrimonial dynamics of accumulation and 
benefiting FRELIMO members, the ruling-party. The farmers’ association ARPONE created to work 
alongside the Chinese company were mostly FRELIMO members. Similarly, some high-up employee of the 
public company in charge of the irrigation scheme joined ARPONE to produce rice (Chichava 2015). 
Therefore, governance issues, land tenure insecurities, market weakness, social struggles and lack of 
infrastructure act as barriers towards investments despite emerging countries’ discourse of familiarity and 
similar challenges with developing economies.   
 
5.2 Agrarian Concerns of Investments and Trade Shifts 
Despite major barriers to materialise investments and emerging countries’ agricultural projects in 
Mozambique, several effects may be identified. Some of them include: i) land concentration and value chain 
reconfigurations; ii) policy mainstreaming and consolidation of a specific development model; and iii) 
consolidation of selective contention movements. First, project failure and abandonment of land by investors 
maintain many of these areas without revocation of land rights until a new wave of investments, which may 
increase land concentration in Mozambique. This scenario is doubly negative because local people are not 
benefitting from employment opportunities and cannot access the unoccupied portions of land. It may 
prevent the development of family farms and let national governments reaffirm its political authority over 
land concession (Smart & Hanlon 2014; Boche 2015). Moreover, Boche identified an incremental process of 
value chain reconfiguration taking place. Control of knowledge and capital are two important elements for 
project success, hence some investors establish a diversification strategy based on vertical integration of 
value chains controlled upstream (Boche 2015). This is the case of the poultry-soy complex in Zambézia and 
Chinese investments in Gaza.  
A second general consequence is the mainstreaming of a development model that may influence public 
policies formulation. The features of this model include consolidation of the role of state as the “facilitator” 
of private investments; development of smallholder agriculture through contract-farming schemes; and 
promotion of technical assistance based on a technological packages. This process is aligned with narratives 
developed by international institutions such as the World Bank, however in the case of emerging countries’ 
projects the strategy is also based on the idea of experience sharing. South-South Cooperation has mainly 
relied on the narrative that developing and emerging partners may share development solutions in a more 
effective way. Both Brazil and China stress how their own local experience may contribute to African 
agriculture.  
ProSAVANA promotes a vision of the private sector as the “driving force of development” and of the 
public sector as “facilitator and supervisor of public policies” (ProSAVANA-PD 2014, 7), which is closely 
aligned with national plans for agriculture. ProSAVANA has been often presented as the executing arm of the 
Mozambican Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development (PEDSA). Likewise, Chinese programmes often 
put high emphasis on financial sustainability (Tang 2014). Furthermore, agricultural investments are often 
promoted as means to accessing new technologies (Liu 2013) and ProSAVANA is based on the idea that low 
productivity is the main determinant of poverty reduction and that smallholders’ access to inputs depends on 
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out-grower schemes. ProSAVANA’s ongoing technical assistance component relies on five models aiming at 
the integration of peasants farmers into agricultural value chains, with no place for alternative techniques or 
conservation agriculture. The focus on productivity is also highlighted in the Chinese demonstration centre 
which is expected to expand from 1-1.5t/ha to 9-10t/ha for some crops (Chichava & Fingermann 2015). 
Finally, contract farming has been promoted as an alternative to land acquisition and consolidated as the 
only solution for reducing rural poverty. The transition from subsistence to market-oriented farming has been 
presented as the major premise for the increase of agricultural productivity (ProSAVANA-PD 2014, 11), 
without taking into account the asymmetric access of smallholders to markets. The same aspect is promoted 
by the company Wanbao Africa Agriculture Development Limited, which received a concession of 6,000 ha 
to produce rice, from which 4,000 ha should be used by local farmers through a contract-farming model. The 
project also suggests that investments may be regulated by voluntary guidelines such as the Principles for 
Responsible Agricultural Investments (FAO/IFAD/UNCTAD/World Bank), but without a clear strategy for 
enforcement or for implementation of inclusive arrangements and local mechanisms of conflict management.  
Both projects thus contribute to a mainstream development model sustained by the leading role of the 
private sector. According to Borras and Franco, this is purportedly justified by the ‘imperatives’ of capital 
accumulation that partly require ‘neoliberal enclosures’ and the expansion of market relations and 
commodification (S. Borras & Franco 2010). This is not exclusive of emerging countries initiatives but they 
contribute to its consolidation, underpinned by the experience sharing and South-South partnership narrative. 
Finally, a third effect is related to local political dynamics facing foreign investments. The emergence of a 
“selective contention movement” has not been effective in preventing risks of other foreign investments. For 
instance, the criticism towards ProSAVANA – and to a lesser degree to Chinese projects22 – has not been 
accompanied by an integrated denunciation of other donors promoting investments in export crops in Nacala 
Corridor.   
The international coalition against ProSAVANA has become a major political phenomenon in 
Mozambique, having attained some of its objectives. However, the territorial reality reveals complex 
political and economic dynamics: on the one hand some local peasants’ organisations and NGOs show 
increasing interest in directly participating in the project, on the other hand, national-level peasants’ 
movements and NGOs contribute to blocking its implementation. Despite strong criticism against land deals, 
other foreign investors from the US, Portugal, Zimbabwe, Norway and South Africa faced no resistance. Soy 
production has received development co-operation support for more than ten years in the Nacala Corridor. 
There have been differences of opinion on the launch of the “No ProSavana Campaign” and among 
urban/rural movements, but also among the many provinces of the Corridor. CSOs in the Nampula province 
are often more critical of the ProSAVANA while those in Niassa do not automatically reject it23. ProSAVANA 
was also blamed by existing conflicts in the Nacala Corridor for which it was not responsible. Meanwhile, 
commercial and land conflicts have been identified in many regions of the Nacala Corridor, such as Rapale, 
Malema, Ribaue, Chimbunila e N’gauma, which are related to other countries’ companies24. 
In the district of Gúrùe, a soya boom has been fostered by donor agencies and NGOs, such as Clusa, 
TechnoServe, Gates Foundation, Norway, Switzerland, the US and the International Institute of Tropical 
                                                     
22 The levels of criticism towards the Chinese project reached violent demonstrations and a FONGA ‘open letter’ to 
Armando Guebuza. Actions counted on the support of other CSOs like Justiça Ambiental (JA) and UNAC and claims 
are also receiving international coverage (Chichava 2015). 
23 The Nampula province is the most populous and has historically benefited from foreign support to civil society 
organisations. However the Niassa province is more isolated in terms of transport infrastructure and attraction of private 
investments. Access of smallholders to local and regional markets is constrained by logistic deficits.  This is also a less 
populated province and civil society organisations are much less articulated. All these factors contribute to the opinion 
that ProSavana will find easier conditions to establish itself in this area.   
24 With companies such as Lurio GreenResources, Matanuska and Chikweti. 
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Agriculture (IITA)25, based on a support package from the Norwegian-funded business programme (Hanlon 
& Smart 2012). Several of these organisations are major funders of CSOs, which could be preventing open 
criticism. A set of other donor-driven initiatives such as the G8 Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA), the Rural Markets Promotion Programme (PROMER), the USAID Mozambique Competitiveness 
and Agribusiness Program (AgriFUTURO) and the JICA Project for the Nacala Corridor Economic 
Development Strategies (PEDEC) are all concretely promoting agribusiness, market-oriented agriculture and 
cash crops, particularly soy, in the North of Mozambique. However most of them have not received much 
public attention in comparison with ProSAVANA.  
This fragmented approach may be the result of local civil society dynamics (including strong activism 
from Brazilian CSOs), the lack of transparency and of support to civil society, which is typical of emerging 
countries intergovernmental international engagement. Nevertheless, such a restrictive tactic constrains a 
broad and integrated strategy concerning recent trends in commodities markets and agrarian change.  
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has shown different shifts in patterns of investment and trade in the context of the increasing role 
of emerging countries in international political economy. The Chinese influence in relocating global 
commodity chains to a South-South axis has important impacts in the domestic contexts of emerging partners 
such as Brazil. The ongoing specialisation of the country’s export structure of primary goods, particularly 
soybeans, has strengthened the bargaining power of domestic agribusiness’ elite vis-à-vis the federal 
government. The result is a renewed influence on domestic legal frameworks, increased financial subsidies 
and the support to their internationalisation beyond regionalists’ patterns. Such commodity integration is 
however not stable as Chinese imports rely on diversified partners and Brazil’s leadership and significance 
could be easily replaced by the US, Argentina or another Latin American country. Such asymmetric 
interdependence is also deepening specialisation on low value-added products as China increases focus on 
the import of whole beans to develop its crushing industry. 
A second shift in commodities economy discussed here included emerging countries’ efforts to establish 
a biofuel complex. Their interest in transforming ethanol into a global commodity and consolidating an 
international market has faced obstacles regarding the domestic and international environment. After a first 
wave of diplomatic and financial strategies to promote ethanol production internationally, a set of constraints 
in terms of international blending mandates, low oil prices, lack of structured policies in third countries 
willing to develop the sector, and a slowdown in Brazil’s domestic ethanol sector contributed to a declining 
trend. This has not prevented a recent engagement in political dialogues aiming to promote international 
technical standards and to provide expertise in legal and institutional frameworks to other nations. Moreover, 
Brazil has sought to coordinate emerging countries in international fora discussing biofuel agendas in order 
to incorporate these countries’ perspective, which could contribute to gradually building up a biofuel 
complex.  
In both the soy and ethanol cases, investments in farmland and agricultural value chains have been 
promoted. Meanwhile, concerning Chinese direct investments in Brazil’s farmland and the aim to deepen this 
bilateral integration, Brazilian authorities have provided the means to increase investments in logistics for 
commodities complexes and their transportation to China for lower costs. A similar approach has been 
identified in South Africa through the role played by FDI in controlling production value chains or through 
                                                     
25  Major investors in the region are Portugal, South Africa, Zimbabwe and the US. A new entrant announced in 2012 is Agromoz, 
owned by groups Américo Amorin of Portugual, Pinesso and  Intelec Holdings  (a Mozambican company part owned by President 
Armando Guebuza). Pinesso is a major soy producer in Brazil and a pioneer investor in the African continent, with investments in 
cotton  in  countries  such  as  Sudan. However,  this  company  has  already  faced  criticism  and  has  been  accused  of  disseminating 
pesticides with adverse effects on the local population’s health. 
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the establishment of agricultural demonstration centres, which control land-related activities without owning 
the land. Complementarily, an incipient agribusiness internationalisation effort beyond Latin America is 
conceivable due to such increasing integration with Asian markets. This relied on significant government 
support, including diplomatic and technical co-operation strategies. 
However, the analysis of macro tendencies regarding agrarian transformations in Brazil and China 
remain incomplete without understanding the role of national and local dynamics in altering the direction, 
the path, and the depth of these emerging changes. The analysis of such dynamics are context-specific, but 
some commonalities stem from our case studies: i) the high proportion of emerging land deals that fail or are 
never implemented; ii) the increasing influence of transnational coalitions of civil society activists in the 
rural sector; and iii) the importance of civil, economic and political elites and of domestic institutional 
frameworks in determining the effects of related transformations. Despite major challenges to the effective 
materialisation of emerging countries’ investments in Mozambique, several results have been identified. 
Besides direct effects of land concentration and reconfiguration of agricultural value chains to deal with the 
risky environment, these initiatives have contributed to consolidating an agricultural model centred on the 
role of the private sector and to reinforce selective contestation movements. Therefore, agrarian restructuring 
trends connected to the rise of emerging economies are still evolving but some of their shapes and potential 
effects in domestic economies and in capital accumulation centres may already be acknowledged. 
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W o r k i n g  P a p e r  S e r i e s  
BICAS is a collective of largely BRICS­based or connected academic and policy­oriented researchers concerned with understanding the 
BRICS countries and some powerful middle income countries (MICs) and their implications for global agrarian transformations. 
Critical theoretical and empirical questions about the origins, character and significance of complex changes underway need to be 
investigated more systematically. BICAS is an ‘engaged research’ initiative founded on a commitment to generating solid evidence and 
detailed, field­based research that can deepen analysis and inform policy and practice – with the aim of ultimately influencing 
international and national policies in favour of rural poor peoples. In BICAS we will aim to connect disciplines across political economy, 
political ecology and political sociology in a multi­layered analytical framework, to explore agrarian transformations unfolding at 
national, regional and global levels and the relationships between these levels. BICAS is founded on a vision for broader, more inclusive 
and critical knowledge production and knowledge exchange. We are building a joint research agenda based principally on our capacities 
and expertise in our respective countries and regions, and informed by the needs of our graduate students and faculty, but aiming to 
scale up in partnership and in dialogue with others, especially social movement activists. BICAS Working Paper Series is one key venue 
where we hope to generate critical and relevant knowledge in collaborative manner. Our initial focus will be on Brazil, China and South 
Africa, the immediate regions where these countries are embedded, and the MICs in these regions. While we will build on a core 
coordinating network to facilitate exchange we aim to provide an inclusive and dynamic space, a platform, a community, hence we 
invite participation. 
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